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Reasoning About Institutional Change:
Winners,Losers and Support for Electoral Reforms
SHAUN

BOWLER AND TODD DONOVAN*

Thisstudyassesseshowthemasspublicreasonsaboutpoliticalinstitutionsby examiningtheeffectsof winning
andlosingon supportfor severalelectoralreformproposals.Thenationalsamplesurveyidentifiedmajorities
supportingproposalsformajorchangesin America'selectoralinstitutions,andthatsuggestedelectorallosses
may have a modesteffect in reducinglosers' satisfactionwith how democracyworks.Randomassignment
experimentsthattestedhypothesesderivedfromtheoriesof riskperceptionwereconducted.It wasfoundthat
people who saw themselvesas winnersandlosersin theelectoralarenareasoneddifferentlywhenproposals
for changewere framedin termsof loss. Losersmaybe just slightlymoresupportivethanwinnersof some
electoralreforms;however,theyappearedless sensitivethanwinnersto framingeffectsthatpresentedreform
proposalsin termsof the risksof loss. Winnersmay supportthe samereformproposalsbuttheirsupportfor
changedecreasedmorewhen the proposalswere framedas a potentialloss. Winnersare thusrisk aversive
whenevaluatingelectoralreformproposals,whilelosersmayevenbe riskseeking.Althoughthissurveyfound
supportfor majorreforms,thepatternsof reasoningthatwereidentifiedin themasspublicsuggesta basisfor
the stabilityof electoralinstitutions.

The stability of electoral institutions is often explained in terms of incumbent elected
officials' self-interest in preserving status quo rules.' Yet electoral systems do change on
occasion in response to popular support for reforms from people who voted for the losers.
Major changes in the Italian election system were forced on established party incumbents
in 1993 by 'outsiders' using the referendum process.2 Likewise, support from voters
aligned with parties out of government was a significant factor in passing a 1993 electoral
reform referendum that changed New Zealand's voting system from first-past-the-post
(FPTP) to Mixed Member Proportional.3
Major electoral system change is a ratherrareevent, nonetheless, with the United States
providing an example of enduring electoral rules that can produce controversial outcomes.
America's FPTP legislative elections awarded Republicans control of a majority of seats
elected in 2004 to both the House and Senate, although Democrats won more votes in
House and Senate races that year. Most voters were on the losing side of three consecutive
presidential elections prior to 2004, and the selection of Florida's decisive presidential
electors in 2000 was particularly acrimonious. As we show in this article, proposals for
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WesternWashingtonUniversity,respectively.Equalco-authors.Earlierversionsof this articlewere presented
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major electoral reforms do receive considerable public support in the United States.
Despite all this, the fundamental processes by which Congress and the president are elected
(single-member districts and the Electoral College) have proven to be resistant to major
change. This phenomenon is not unique: in Britain and Canada, a majority of voters
regularly cast ballots against the party that wins control of government while many
proposals for reforming electoral systems languish. This suggests a bit of a paradox: if
proposals for change are relatively popular and most voters are often on the losing side
of major elections, why are established electoral institutions so stable?
We study this paradox at the level of the voter by examining how electoral winners and
losers reason about institutional change.4 The long-run resilience of representative
democracy requires that those who lose in the electoral arenashare some basic commitment
to maintaining democratic institutions. People who support winners and losers in elections
may see electoral institutions differently, and institutions, as North notes, are the 'rules of
the game' that structure a society.5 Recent scholarship underscores the important
relationships between electoral loss and attitudes about democratic institutions.6 Other
research has made important strides in advancing our understanding of how citizens
evaluate democratic institutions.7 Here we bridge these literatures by considering how
responses to electoral loss and losing shape citizen reasoning about democratic institutions.
This study is an attempt to build on our understanding of how people make choices about
institutions, a project that Nobel-laureate Douglass North argues is perhaps the
fundamental question we must address in order to make further progress in the social
sciences.8
The article is divided into three broad sections. In the first section, we discuss the
relationship between political institutions and loss, setting out hypotheses that relate to
citizen attitudes towards institutional change. In the second section, we present
experimental evidence that addresses these hypotheses. We present two types of
experiments; one where we prompt people to consider how often candidates they support
win and lose in order to test the effects of winning and losing on their assessments of how
well democracy works. We show that considerations of losing may have a modest effect
on depressing satisfaction with democracy. We then present a series of experiments where
we prompt people to consider risks associated with adopting electoral reforms. In most of
these experiments, people who perceive themselves as electoral losers are less risk aversive

4
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than winners, and winners are more risk averse than losers. In the final section, we draw
out the implications of these findings for democratic institutions more broadly.
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND LOSING

Many studies of legitimacy in democratic societies assess attitudes towards current
institutions by examining levels of satisfaction with democracy, or trust in government.9
Democracies may remain stable and be seen as legitimate by citizens as long as political
minorities who lose are willing to remain committed to playing the game of electoral
politics.10 Acceptance of the existing rules of the game may erode, however, among those
who lose, and especially among those who lose repeatedly. Repeat losers are, furthermore,
more likely to begin to think about changing the rules.11Our approachto assessing support
for changing political institutions is to see how perceptions of electoral losses affect how
people evaluate proposals to alter electoral institutions. We seek to determine if perceptions
of losses affect how people evaluate the way democracy works, and to assess how electoral
winners and losers reason about changing democratic institutions.
Satisfaction with how democracy is working is one standard measure of mass
attachments to current electoral institutions. Another, more telling, measure of this is the
public's willingness to change their currentdemocratic institutions and support alternative
arrangements. A willingness to change may be seen as a sign of how discontented people
really are with their current institutions. One of the major questions of interest below is
the degree to which being a 'loser' in an electoral sense pushes people into changing rules
about how elections and representation work. We suggest that when people are presented
with alternative institutional arrangements their choices may be informed by some level
of self-interest: winners may be disposed towards preserving institutional rules under
which they won, while losers may be likely to want to make new electoral rules that are
favourable to them. Losers, wanting to become winners, may support rule changes that
offer the promise of making them winners or giving them more influence over policy
making.12 If ordinary citizens reason like this, we should see that losers are more likely
than winners to support proposals for institutional change.
This is a relatively straightforwardargument to make when discussing political elites,
and a few studies have provided evidence in its support in that context.13 The novelty here
is in applying such an argument to the mass public, and the evidence we present below
speaks to how well such a model of rational calculation may explain how ordinarycitizens
view political institutions. The argument can be extended to consider the different ways
that institutional changes may be framed. Any real-world institutional change is likely to
be quite complicated and have a number of different consequences. In presenting people
9 Ola Listhaug,'TheDynamicsof Trustin Politicians',in Hans-DieterKlingermann
andDieterFuchs,eds,
Citizensand the State(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1995),pp. 261-98; KarpandBanducci,'To KnowIt
Is to Love It?SatisfactionwithDemocracyin theEuropeanUnion';Norris,CriticalCitizens:GlobalSupportfor
Democratic Governance; Kaase and Newton, Beliefs in Government.

10AndersonandGuillory,'PoliticalInstitutionsandSatisfactionwithDemocracy';Listhaug,'TheDynamics
of Trustin Politicians'.
" WilliamRiker,TheArt of PoliticalManipulation(New Haven,Conn.:Yale UniversityPress, 1986).
12 Nicholas Miller, 'Pluralism and Social Choice', American Political Science Review, 77 (1983), 734-46;
Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation.

13Forexample,KathleenBawn, 'TheLogicalof Institutional
Preferences:GermanElectoralLaw as a Social
Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science, 37 (1993), 965-89.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:48:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

458

BOWLER AND DONOVAN

with proposals for electoral system changes it is possible to emphasize some potential
consequences over others, and to stimulate different modes of reasoning about institutions
by changing question wording in survey experiments. One way that consequences of
institutional changes may be framed is in terms of risks and losses. Institutions determine
who winners and losers are, and are thus 'distributional' in nature either very often14 or
all the time.15Losses (or gains) that may be incurredas a result of the change are thus central
to questions about institutional change. In our experimental setting we frame questions
about institutional change in neutral terms or with positive language, and then contrast the
effects of such framing with similar questions framed to present the change in terms of
a risk or loss.
EXPERIMENTS

ON LOSING

AND SUPPORT

FOR INSTITUTIONAL

CHANGE

Our experimental design includes four conditions to consider when thinking about how
people might respond to proposals calling for institutional reforms. These are:
(a) current winners under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative
arrangement where risk is not emphasized,
current
losers under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative
(b)
arrangement where risk is not emphasized,
(c) current winners under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative
arrangement where risk is emphasized, and
(d) current losers under status quo institutions who are presented with an alternative
arrangement where risk is emphasized.
We test how citizens reason about democratic institutions by offering them alternative
versions of four electoral reform proposals, where the alternative versions frame the
consequences of reforms differently - one version of each proposal places no emphasis
on risk of loss, while the other version does. Our hypotheses are derived from theories of
attitudes towards risk. Experimental psychology has demonstrated that people are more
sensitive to the prospect of personal losses than gains in many contexts.16 Drawing from
this, we expect that proposals for institutional change framed in terms of a risk of loss
(conditions (c) and (d) above) will generally receive less support. However, given the
discussion in the previous section, we also expect that losers may generally be more
supportive of institutional change than winners.
As the Appendix illustrates, our survey included two versions of four distinct questions
about electoral reform to re-create conditions (a) through (d) noted above. Respondents
to our survey were randomly assigned one of two versions of four questions about changing
14 George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in

California
Press,1990).

ComparativePolitics (Berkeley:Universityof

CambridgeUniversityPress, 1992).
~5JackKnight,Institutionsand Social Conflict(Cambridge:

16DanielKahneman
and Amos Tversky,'ProspectTheory:An Analysisof DecisionUnderRisk',
Econometrica,47 (1979), 263-91; Daniel Kahnemanand Amos Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); James Andreoni, 'Warm Glow versus Cold Prickle: The Effects
of Positive and Negative Framing on Cooperation in Experiments', QuarterlyJournal of Economics, 110 (1995),
1-21; Donald Philip Green, Daniel Kahneman and Howard Kunreuther, 'How the Scope and Method of Public
Funding Affect Willingness to Pay for Public Goods', Public Opinion Quarterly, 58 (1994), 49-67; B. J. McNeil,
S. G. Pauker,H. C. Sox and A. Tversky, 'On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies', New England
Journal ofMedicine, 306 (1982), 1259-62; V. Hueber, M. Neale and G. Northcraft, 'Decision Bias and Personnel
Selection Strategies', Organizational Behavior and Human Decisions Processes, 40 (1987), 136-47.
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electoral arrangements in the United States. The questions asked if they supported term
limits for Congress, direct election of the president, proportional representation and a
national referendum process. Much of the language in each version of the questions was
identical except for how the consequences of the proposed reforms were framed. Version
A of each question is framed with no reference to any risk of a loss and/or with the use
of positive language suggesting the reform would 'give' voters something, produce 'more'
of something, or yield some 'gain'. Version B of each question is framed in terms of the
potential risk of some kind of loss, and uses negative language to frame the consequences
(for example, that something cannot happen if the reform is adopted, that there will be less
of something, that something will be undermined or that something will be lost). Our
frames may thus be seen as randomly assigning subjects alternative interpretations of the
consequences of institutional reforms. Our point is not to frame potential gains or losses
associated with institutional change in terms of logical equivalents (as Khaneman and
Tversky did),17 but to test how people respond to different interpretations of the
consequences of electoral reforms.
The literature on the psychology of choice leads us to expect that the effect of the
negative stimulus (the risk of losses) may be different across electoral winners and losers.
This allows us to develop some specific expectations about the patterns of responses we
may see associated with conditions (a) through (d). Results from experiments that simulate
monetary gambles illustrate that fear of losses leads subjects to become more risk-seeking
in order to avoid loss.1' Those who have been losing repeatedly, moreover, become more
willing to accept a risky bet.19That is, at some point the default aversion to risk of losses
may be overtaken by the effect of losing. Thus, our major question of interest is, are losers
less risk averse than winners when reasoning about proposals for changing electoral
institutions? Evidence affirming this question would suggest that, at some unknown point,
there may be destabilizing effects of electoral rules that create a category of citizens who
perceive themselves as chronic losers. Conversely, aversion to risk may well reduce
support for institutional change. For example, it may be that concerns about risk make
winners especially reluctant to consider changing institutions. In terms of the list of
conditions outlined above we expect, among winners, supportfor change to be higher under
condition (a) than condition (c).
A related question considers the other major group under study - to our mind the more
interesting one - the losers. A great deal of attention is typically paid to the winners in any
political setting. But the losers comprise an important group because their reaction to loss
and losing can condition the broader success or failure of the system as a whole. In this
case, we consider whether electoral losers are less risk averse or more risk seeking when
considering proposals to change institutions. Are losers in the electoral arena somehow less
sensitive to risks associated with altering institutions? Winners may be especially risk
averse. If they do well under current arrangements then when they are presented with a
reform proposal where risks of changing the status quo are stressed, it seems reasonable
to suppose they become less likely to support change. But is this necessarily the case for
losers? Although we expect losers to be generally supportive of change, is this support also
likely to decline once the risks of potential losses associated with change are stressed?
17 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Choices, Values, and Frames', American Psychologist, 39 (1984),
341-50.
18 Kahneman and Tversky, 'Choices, Values, and Frames'.
19 William J. Gehring and Adrian R. Willoughby, 'The Medial Frontal Cortex and the Rapid Processing of
Monetary Gains and Losses', Science, 295 (2002), 2279-82.
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A straightforwardhypothesis of risk aversion would suggest that, like winners, losers are
likely to shy away from the risks of change. Thus, support for change may be lower among
winners in condition (c) than winners in condition (a); and lower among losers in condition
(d) than losers in condition (b).
However, both theory and empirical findings in the psychology literature lead us to
expect that losers are less sensitive to risks of future losses and are thus more willing
to gamble with institutional change. That is, we suggest that winners and losers are not
likely to have similar responses to current institutions nor are they likely to have similar
aversion to the risks of changing those institutions. If this is the case, support for change
should be higher among losers exposed to the risk frame (Group C) than among winners
exposed to the risk frame (B). Likewise, when winners consider the risk of loss associated
with change, those considerations may have a larger effect on reducing their support for
change than such considerations of risk have on reducing support among losers. Put
differently, the decline in supportfor electoral reforms across people in (A) and (C) should
be greater than the decline in support across people in (B) and (D).
TABLE

1

Hypotheses about Levels of Support in Each Group
Respondent's status

Stimulus

Electoral winner

Electoral loser

A
C

B
D

Electoral reform framed neutral or as gain
Electoral reform framed as a loss

Note: The hypotheses are: B > A (losers are more supportiveof change); A > C (stimulus of
risk/loss decreases support for change for winners); B > D (stimulus of risk/loss decreases

support for change for losers), but losers are less risk averse than winners, so C > D, or
(A - C)> (B - D) (effect of risk frame is weaker among losers than winners).

These hypotheses about how electoral losers and winners respond to questions designed
to simulate risks associated with changing electoral arrangements are presented
schematically in Table 1. Our survey includes three questions designed to construct
measures of a respondents' perceptions of their personal electoral losses that allow us to
test whether questions framed as risky propositions elicit less support among respondents
who perceive themselves as electoral winners than among those who perceive themselves
as electoral losers. Here, we assume that perceptions of losing in the electoral arena over
a time period may have consequences on attitudes about electoral rules. Our questions
about electoral wins and losses thus ask respondents to consider whether candidates they
supported 'in their lifetime' usually win or lose.
EXPERIMENTS

ON LOSING

AND SATISFACTION

WITH DEMOCRACY

Before assessing how winning and losing affect reasoning about democratic institutions,
we need to examine how winning and losing might shape how people perceive
democracy. We have reasons to expect that losers are likely to be less satisfied with how
democracy works.20 Scholars have also established that measures of satisfaction with
20

SusanBanducciandJeffreyKarp,'How ElectionsChangethe Way CitizensView the PoliticalSystem:
Campaigns,MediaEffects, and ElectoralOutcomesin ComparativePerspective',BritishJournalof Political
Science,33 (2003), 443-67.
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democracy reflect the effects of political institutions,21 short-term effects of specific
campaign outcomes, media exposure22 and economic conditions.23 Our experimental
design alternates the position of survey questions asking about electoral losses to test how
considerations of electoral losses affect how satisfied citizens report being with the way
democracy works.
Previous studies have identified that responses to a survey question can be conditioned
by the content of items asked prior to the question.24One way to interpretthese 'question
order' effects is that a series of questions may shape the context in which people consider
a later question, and trigger deeper thought about a subject than whatever ideas were
initially at 'the top of their heads at the moment of answering'.25We expect that a series
of questions on losing in the electoral arena will stimulate respondents to consider their
personal electoral losses when evaluating how well democracy works (see Appendix for
the wording of all questions used in this study). We expect that the satisfaction with
democracy question - measured with a survey item used frequently in the Comparative
Study of Electoral Systems studies26 - will elicit less satisfaction among losers if the
question is asked immediately after a series of questions about winning and losing. This
experiment provides a test of whether people evaluate democracy, at least in part, on
whether it would make them a winner or a loser.
DATA AND RESULTS

Our experiments were conducted as a module on a survey funded by the Timesharing
Experiments in the Social Sciences (TESS) project. The national, random-sample survey
of 700 adults was conducted by the University of Indiana Survey Research Center in the
autumn of 2003.27 Apart from an over-representation of women (55 per cent), the sample
is broadly representative of the eligible American voting public: about one-third identified
as Democrat and one-third as Republican, roughly one-fifth were under age 33 and
21

Hans-DieterKlingemann,'MappingPoliticalSupportin the 1990s:A GlobalAnalysis',in PippaNorris,ed.,

Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),

pp. 31-56; ArendtLijphart,Patternsof Democracy(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress,1999);Anderson
and Guillory,'PoliticalInstitutionsand Satisfactionwith Democracy'.
22 Banducciand Karp,'How Elections
Changethe Way CitizensView the PoliticalSystem'.
23 HaroldD. Clarke,NitishDuttandAllan
Kornberg,'ThePoliticalEconomyof AttitudesTowardPolityand
Societyin WesternEuropeanDemocracies',Journalof Politics,55 (1993), 998-1021; AndersonandGuillory,
'PoliticalInstitutionsand Satisfactionwith Democracy'.
24 PaulAbramson,BrianSilverandBarbara
Anderson,'TheEffectsof QuestionOrderin AttitudeSurveys',
AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience,31 (1987), 900-8; GeorgeF. Bishop,RobertW. OldendickandAlfred
'PoliticalInformation
Tuchfarber,
Processing:QuestionOrderandContextEffects',PoliticalBehavior,4 (1982),
117-200; Howard Schuman and Stanley Presser, Question and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on
Question Form, Wording, and Context (New York: Academic Press, 1981).

25 JohnZallerand StanleyFeldman,'A SimpleTheoryof the SurveyResponse:AnsweringQuestionsvs.
Revealing Preferences', American Journal of Political Science, 36 (1992), 579-616.

26 David Brockington,'The Paradoxof ProportionalRepresentation:
The Effect of Party Systems and
Coalitionson ElectoralParticipation',
PoliticalStudies,52 (2004),469-90; BanducciandKarp,'HowElections
Changethe Way CitizensView the PoliticalSystem'.
27 These700 interviewscamefromfoursurveymoduleshaving2,015interviewsof 7,631eligibleorpotentially
eligible contactattempts(residentialor personaltelephone-lines).Ourquestionsappearedfirstin each module;
28 per cent of all eligible contactsand contactsof unknowneligibilityresponded(AAPORRR3);33 per cent
refused,11 percentwereneveravailableandthe eligibilityof 26 percent of contactswas unknown(no answer,
44 percentrefused,
alwaysbusy, etc.). If contactsof unknowneligibilityareexcluded,35 percentparticipated,
16 per cent were neveravailableand3 per cent were excludeddue to languageproblems.
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one-fifth were over 65, about half the sample had incomes below $35,000 and half had
incomes greater than this. These respondents are randomly assigned to different categories
of treatment in our experiments.
The basic patternwe expect to see is that losers are more supportive of changing electoral
arrangements, and that winners and losers reason differently about changing electoral
arrangements. How then, might we identify winners and losers in the electoral arena?
Existing studies of the effects of electoral losses typically depend on a single election event
(often drawn from election study surveys) to define who winners and losers are.28One
potential problem with this approachis that it is difficult to distinguish the effects of a single
electoral loss from attitudes about a specific government, or from events associated with
a specific election. Someone may vote for a party that does not end up in government, but
this need not mean that person regularly votes for that party, or for a party that is regularly
excluded from government. The election study approach at measuring the effects of losses
is thus largely unable to capture the subjective effects of perceptions of long-term electoral
losses, or of expectations about future losses.
We designed three questions to measure peoples' experiences with wins and losses more
broadly. Multiple questions were needed in part because America' s separation of powers
and federalism mean that few people will probably think of themselves as categorical losers
in the electoral arenaat any fixed point in time. Three different questions asked respondents
to consider whether candidates they support usually win or usually lose elections. One
asked them to reflect on all presidential elections held in their lifetime, another asked them
to reflect on all congressional elections held in their lifetime, and a thirdasked them to 'look
ahead' and consider their prospects in future local, state or national elections. Responses
to these questions were used to assess how the effects of voters' perceptions of electoral
losses affected their support for various electoral reform proposals.
This approachgives us a more subject-defined measurement of losing than exists in other
studies, which is particularly important as we expect it is memories and perceptions of
electoral loss generally that affect behaviour, as much as actual experience supporting a
specific losing candidate. Two disadvantages of this approach, however, are that people
tend to develop more favourable attitudes towards winning candidates over time even if
they voted for a loser,29 and the dynamics of interpersonal comparisons is likely to lead
some people to desire to be winners and thus report that they are. Both factors probably
lead to over-reporting of winners, which may mute our observed differences between
winners' and losers' attitudes and modes of reasoning.
The Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) survey platform allowed us to use
an experimental design that manipulated how institutional change questions were
presented to respondents. In particular,it allowed us to frame institutional changes in terms
of gains or losses, allowing us to pose and test four hypotheses. We will present evidence
addressing the first of these hypotheses via descriptive data, but Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 are
tested with specific question-wording experiments:
HYPOTHESIS

1 Losers will be more supportive of institutional change than winners,
regardless of how proposals for institutional change are framed.

28 AndersonandGuillory,'PoliticalInstitutions
andSatisfactionwithDemocracy';BanducciandKarp,'How
ElectionsChangethe Way CitizensView the PoliticalSystem'.
29 Allan J. Cigler and Russell Getter,'ConflictReductionin the Post-ElectionPeriod', WesternPolitical
Quarterly,30 (1977), 363-76; Andersonet al., Losers' Consent.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:48:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Reasoning About Institutional Change

463

HYPOTHESIS 2

Perceptions of electoral losses will affect how well people think democracy
works. Considerations of electoral losses should make people less satisfied
with democracy (Experiment 1 below).
HYPOTHESIS 3 When proposals for institutional change are framed in terms of risks of loss,
support for institutional change will be lower among all respondents. In the
experiments below: (a) > (c) and (b) > (d).
4
HYPOTHESIS Losers will be less responsive than winners to the effect of framing
proposals for institutional changes as a risk of loss. In the experiment below:
(c) > (d); or ((a) - (c)) > ((b) - (d)).

Despite the close nature of US elections conducted proximate to the time of our
survey (Autumn 2003), and the fact that most Americans did not vote for the incumbent
president or the party that controlled Congress at the time of our survey, it is noteworthy
that relatively few respondents thought of themselves as losers when asked to consider
elections they have participated in over the long term. Figure 1 illustrates that between
a quarter to a third of respondents said that most of the candidates they supported
lost in presidential and congressional elections held in their lifetime. The data also reflect
optimism about the future: over 70 per cent expected that candidates they support
would win 'most of the time' in future elections. Furthermore, there are relatively
few who perceive themselves as chronic losers in the electoral arena. That is, only 7
per cent of respondents fell into the loser category across all three questions represented
in Figure 1, and only 22 per cent fell into the loser category on at least two of the
three questions. In contrast, 46 per cent fell into the winner categories on three
questions, and another 32 per cent fell into the loser category on only one of the
three questions.
At this point, we can only speculate about how accurately these perceptions of winning
and losing match reality in the United States. As Wright has shown,30survey respondents
probably over-estimate their tendency to support winning candidates. We also expect that
many Americans really are on the winning side of most elections they vote in, due to the
fact that most Americans live in partisan gerrymandered US House districts where huge
majorities vote for the congressional candidate of the dominant party in the district. Or we
might assume that it only takes a couple of wins in any election for people to think of
themselves as winners over the long haul. That is, people might discount losses in their
memory, and recall instances when candidates they supported were winners.
The importantpoint for our analysis is that we have a group of respondents who identify
themselves as losers in the electoral arena and who were randomly assigned different
versions of our questions asking about institutional change. Moreover, cross tabulations
of perceptions of winning and losing by party affiliation give evidence for the validity of
our measures of losing: Democrats were significantly more likely than Republicans to
report being losers in past presidential elections (x2= 2 1, p < 0.000) and were more likely
to expect to lose in the future (X2= 23, p < 0.000). This is consistent with the fact that
Democratic candidates lost four of the six presidential contests prior to the survey, and with
Democrats losing the US House, Senate and presidential elections in the year following
our survey. Partisan differences were not significant in responses to the question about
congressional elections (X2= 4,p > 0.40), which is consistent with the fact that the parties'
30 GeraldC. Wright,'Misreports
of theVotein the 1988SenateElectionStudy',LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,
15 (1990), 543-63.
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Fig. 1. Perceptions of electoral wins and losses in the United States
Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research. National sample, random
digit dial, conducted October through November 2003.
Note: For the first two questions, respondents were asked, 'Think about the [presidential/congressional] elections
held in your lifetime. Do you think that the [presidential/congressional] candidates you support usually win, or
usually lose?' The third question asked, 'Looking ahead to any upcoming local, state, or national elections - how
do you think most of the candidates you support will do?' Some respondents volunteered that they 'sometimes
win'. N = 694 cases for the presidential question, 688 for the congressional question and 668 for expectations.

control of the US Congress was largely balanced in the years prior to our survey.31Again,
we are concerned not so much about the accuracy of perceptions of losing but about how
people who perceive themselves as losers or winners differ in how they reason about
proposals to change institutions.
Table 2 reports descriptive data illustrating differences in support for reform proposals
across electoral winners and losers. It lists the percentage of respondents supporting the
four electoral reform proposals we asked about: imposing term limits on Congress,
establishing a national referendum process, direct election of the president and
proportional representation (PR) for Congress. Levels of support for each proposal is listed
for winners and losers - classified in terms of their self-reported perceptions.
We find that a majority of electoral winners and majority of electoral losers were in
favour of changing to direct presidential elections, imposing term limits on Congress and
establishing provisions for a national referendum process. Majorities of losers were
supportive of proportional representation, while majorities of winners were opposed. Our
31
Democrats
controlled
theHouseandSenatefordecadesuntil1995,broken
control
byaperiodof Republican
of theSenatefrom1981to 1987.Republicans
controlled
bothchambers
frommuchof 1995through
2005,with
neitherpartyhavingmorethan51 percentof Senateseatsfrom2001to 2004.
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Attitudes about Electoral Reform in the United States by Respondent's
Status as a Loser in the Electoral Arena

Usually supports
presidential
candidates who:

Usually supports
congressional
candidates who:

Win

Lose

Win

Lose

88%
(513)

68%
(174)

87%
(464)

74%
(505)

71%
(173)

72%
(505)

Support direct
election of the
President
Support proportional
representationfor
Congress

Satisfied with the way
democracy works

Win

Lose

75%
(220)

86%
(501)

73%
(165)

72%
(458)

77%
(217)

73%
(494)

74%
(163)

74%
(172)

72%
(455)

74%
(217)

71%
(493)

73%
(162)

52%
(507)

57%
(169)

53%
(455)

53%
(215)

51%
(498)

58%
(158)

44%
(485)

58%
(160)

46%
(434)

50%
(207)

44%
(470)

59%
(158)

p > 0.000

Support term limits
on Congress
Support a national
referendumprocess

Expectations about
how candidates R
supportswill do
in future:

p< 0.02

p< 0.001

p< 0.000

p < 0.001

Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research.
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003.
Note: Entries are percentageagreeing strongly or very strongly with the proposal for change,
and the percentagesatisfiedor very satisfiedwith democracyin the United States. Significance
based on x2 tests. Values in parentheses are total number of respondents in category of
winner/loser.

initial expectation (see Hypothesis 1 above) was that losers would be consistently more
supportive of proposals for institutional change, regardless of how the proposal was
framed. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find higher support for changing US House
elections to PR among losers (58 per cent) than winners (44 per cent). We find, however,
that losers were just slightly more supportive of changing how the president is elected than
winners were (57 to 52 per cent) and were only slightly more likely than winners to support
term limits (77 to 72 per cent). The evidence in Table 2 provides some support for
Hypothesis 1, but the results are clearly mixed. In some cases there were trivial differences
between winners' and losers' attitudes about electoral reform proposals. Of course, these
data in Table 2 do not account for how the risk of adopting the reforms was framed. The
experiments reported below allow us to test whether the data in Table 2 overstate support
for change among electoral winners and losers by testing additional hypotheses that are
at the heart of our experimental analysis. That is, how do winners and losers' attitudes about
these reform proposals shift when they are given other factors to consider?
The descriptive data in Table 2 also demonstrate that losers in America, no matter how
defined, are less satisfied with how democracy works than winners. Satisfaction with
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democracy is 20 per cent lower among Americans who see themselves as regularly being
on the losing side of presidential elections. In a study of Europe, Anderson et al. found
that this inverse relationship between electoral loss and satisfaction with democracy
existed in unitary and federal systems alike, as well as in nations with single-party or
multi-party governments - but dissatisfaction among losers was greatest in unitary systems
and in nations where one party formed the government.32Despite effects that federalism
may have on dampening the consequences of electoral loss, our data illustrate that
perceptions of electoral loss nonetheless have substantial effects on attitudes about how
well democracy functions in the United States.
We are interested in how these perceptions of electoral loss affect evaluations of
democracy and how they affect people's reasoning about changing democratic arrangements. That is, do considerations of electoral prospects weaken the mass public's
satisfaction with democracy? Are evaluations of democracy malleable enough to be
affected by short-term considerations of electoral loss? Do considerations of risk
associated with institutional change affect winners and losers the same way? We turn now
to the experiments to answer these questions.
Do Considerations of Electoral Losses Affect How Satisfied People Are with the Way
Democracy Works?
We tested this by randomly assigning half of respondents the satisfaction with democracy
question before offering them our three questions about winning and losing, and by
assigning the other half the satisfaction item immediately after asking the three questions
about winning and losing. Table 3 reports levels of satisfaction with democracy
(percentage very satisfied + percentage satisfied), for electoral winners and losers
randomly assigned to each experimental condition. Respondents are classified as winners
and losers based on their responses to the three electoral loss questions. Those who
responded as winners on at least two of the three questions (presidential elections,
congressional elections and future expectations) are classified as winners. Those who
responded as losers on at least two of the three questions are classified as losers.
Results of this experiment reported in Table 3 illustrate that electoral losers may become
even less satisfied with democracy when they are prompted to consider how often they lose.
This suggests that other studies making use of secondary survey measures of losing
(reported vote) may understate the effects of losing, as such studies do not prompt
respondents to consider that they have lost. We also find slightly higher levels of
satisfaction with democracy among winners if they were asked the satisfaction question
after being prompted with questions that made them consider how often their candidates
win or lose. We find a much larger effect among losers - there is less satisfaction with
democracy among losers who were asked to evaluate democracy immediately after being
prompted to consider the electoral success of their candidates. That is, 69 per cent of losers
reported being satisfied with democracy when they were not prompted to consider whether
candidates they support win or lose. Satisfaction with democracy among losers drops to
62 per cent among those prompted to consider whether candidates they support usually
win or lose. The total effect of being prompted to consider wins and losses amounts to a
9 per cent change in levels of satisfaction: a 2.1 per cent increase in satisfaction with

32 Andersonet al., Losers' Consent.
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Experimental Results: Consideration of Electoral Losses Erodes
Satisfaction with Democracy among Losers
Respondent's status
Winner

Loser

Asked satisfaction with democracy before
three questions about electoral losses

86.4% (272)

68.9% (89)

Asked satisfaction with democracy after
three questions about electoral losses
Percentage point difference

88.5% (279)
+ 2.1

62.0% (58)
- 6.9

9.0%

Big winner

Loser

Net difference

Asked satisfaction with democracy before
three questions about electoral losses

86.8% (167)

68.9% (89)

Asked satisfaction with democracy after
three questions about electoral losses
Percentage point difference

91.4% (163)
+ 4.6

62.0% (58)
- 6.9

Net difference

11.5%T

Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research.
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003.
Note: Cell entries are percentagewho respondedthat they were very satisfied or satisfied with
democracy, with the total numberof subjects per subgroupin parentheses.'Winner' are those
who classified themselves as winners on at least two of the three questions; losers are those
coded as losers on at least two of the three questions used to measure losing. Big winners are
those classified as winners on all three questions.
Significance of differences between groups is derived from a logistic regression equation,
where the individual's responseto the satisfactionwith democracyquestion (1 = satisfied/very
satisfied, 0 = dissatisfied/very dissatisfied) is predicted as a function of dummy variable
representingbeing a winner asked the question before the loss prompt,or a loser asked after
the loss prompt.
$Significant difference between winners and losers across response to risk frame (p = 0.12).

democracy among winners, and a 6.9 per cent decline in satisfaction among losers. This
is consistent with our initial expectation (Hypothesis 2) discussed above. Table 3 also
compares big winners (those who never respond as a loser on our three measures) to losers.
We find a larger increase in satisfaction among big winners who were asked to evaluate
democracy after considering their history of wining and losing, with the total effect of the
prompt to be 11.5 per cent when big winners are compared to losers.
To put these results into better perspective, electoral losers have lower levels of
satisfaction to startwith, but their satisfaction erodes even furtherwhen they consider how
well their candidates fare in elections. The winner-loser gap in satisfaction with democracy
becomes quite striking when the effect of being a winner or loser is combined with the
effect of being prompted to consider electoral wins and losses. As illustrated in Table 3,
we see that 88.5 per cent of American winners reported being satisfied with democracy
when asked that question after considering how well their candidates fare in elections. In
contrast, only 62 per cent of losers reported being satisfied after considering how well their
candidates do - a 26.5 per cent gap in levels of satisfaction with democracy. The gap is
even larger (29.4 per cent) when big winners are compared to losers.
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Evaluations of how well democracy works thus appear to be highly sensitive to the
effects of winning and losing, and, on top of this, to prompts that remind people about their
wins and losses. Considerations of wins and losses appear to have different effects for
winners and loser; making winners more satisfied and losers less so. Our next experiments
were designed to test whether electoral winners and losers also reason differently about
proposals to change democratic institutions. Specifically, we test whether support for
change is sensitive to potential risks associated with change, and whether sensitivity to
risks of loss affects winners and losers the same way.
Does Aversion to Risk Reduce Support for Institutional Change? Are Losers Less Risk
Averse when Reasoning about Changing Institutions?
The risk aversion theory discussed above led us to expect that the answers to all of these
questions are 'Yes' (see Hypotheses 3 and 4 above). We used the CATI platform to
structurefour 2 X 2 experiments related to the questions above. The results of the first three
are presented in Tables 4 and 5. The results of the last are reported in Table 6. In each of
the 2 x 2's in these tables, the upper left-hand cells represent people in condition (A) from
our hypotheses described in Table 1; people in condition (B) are represented in the upper
right-hand cells, condition (C) in the lower left-hand cells, and condition (D) by the lower
right-hand cells.
These experiments were designed to advance our understanding of how citizens reason
when considering proposals to alter democratic institutions. As noted above, respondents
were randomly assigned a version of each of the four questions about electoral reform. The
question wording was alternated to frame each proposal either as a loss, or as a gain
(or neutral). For example, one version of the term limits question asked: 'Some people
suggest that there should be term limits on members of Congress - so incumbents could
only run for re-election three or four times. This might give new candidates a better chance
to gain office. Would you support such a proposal?' The alternative version framed the
proposal as a risk of loss by including the same initial sentence, but replaced the sentence
about 'gaining office' with, 'This might mean losing some of the most experienced
members in Congress.' Similar wording variation was used to present risky and non-risky
versions of each proposal.
In Table 4, winners and losers are classified in terms of their responses to the question
about congressional elections (since the reform proposals would affect how Congress
functions). The point of the tables is to allow comparisons of support for each institutional
change depending on whether the proposal was presented in terms of the risk of a loss or
not. Reading down the first column of numbers we can see if support for each proposal
among winners shifted when it was presented as a risk of a loss. Reading down the second
column, we see whether support for institutional change shifted when the risk of loss
version of the proposal was presented to losers.
Table 4 illustrates that the experimental results for winners largely match our a priori
theoretical expectations set out in Hypothesis 3. The decline in support for change among
winners produced by framing a proposal as a loss was statistically significant in two of three
tests. Winners were much less supportive of the referendum proposal and the term limits
proposal when these reforms were framed as having a risk of some loss. The risk frame
had a negligible effect on winners' support for PR, however. In Table 5 we report results
of the same experiments, but with winners and losers classified in terms of their future
expectations about winning and losing. In Table 5 we see that winners' support for a
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Experimental Results: Perceptions of Electoral Loss and Risk Aversion
Respondent's status

Stimulus
Term limits on Congress (framed as gain)
Term limits on Congress (framed as loss)
Percentage point difference

National referendum(framed as gain)
National referendum(framed as loss)
Percentage point difference

PR for Congress (neutralframe)
PR for Congress (framed as loss)
Percentage point difference

Winners

Losers

80.4% (235)
63.2% (223)

86.6% (112)
66.7% (105)

- 17.2**

79.0% (220)
65.1% (235)
- 13.9**

47.0% (223)
46.0% (211)
- 0.9

- 19.9**

Net diff. in
effect of
framing
as loss

-2.7%

74.6% (122)
73.7% (95)
- 0.9

46.1% (102)
54.3% (105)
+ 8.2t

14.8%*

9.1%$

Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research.
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003.
Note: Cell entries are percentage who agree strongly or very strongly with the proposal for
change, with the number of subjects per subgroup in parentheses. Losers are identified by
responses to the question about congressional elections.
Significancebetween experimentalgroupsis derivedfrom a logistic regressionequation,where
the individual's response to a question about institutionalchange (1 = strongly agree/agree,
0 = disagree/stronglydisagree) is predictedas a function of the question version (B, the risky
version = 1, version A = 0), being a loser (1 = reportsusually supportinglosing congressional
candidates, 0 = other), and an interactionterm (question version B x loser), with controls for
gender, partisanship,ideology and age. The interactiontests whetherlosers' sensitivity to the
risky version of a question about institutionalchange is significantlydifferentfrom winners'.
*Significant difference between groups of winners and losers in response to the risk frame
(reading across, p < 0.05).
**Significantdifferences within group (readingdown, p < 0.05), based on Z score calculating
significance of difference between proportions.
tSignificant differences within group (readingdown, p < 0.12), based on Z score calculating
significance of difference between proportions.
tSignificant difference between winners and losers in response to risk frame (readingacross,
p = 0.11).
national referendum process dropped 11 percentage points when the proposal was
presented as a risk, while winners' support for term limits dropped by 20 percentage points
when the proposal is framed as a risk. Supportfor each proposal was thus consistently lower
among winners who were presented the risky version of the reform proposal.
However, contrary to our initial expectation (Hypothesis 3), framing the proposal in
terms of a loss did not always decrease support for institutional change among all
respondents. Support for the PR proposal among losers (defined in terms of congressional
elections or their future expectations) did not decline when the proposal was framed as the
prospect of a loss. In fact, with the PR for Congress proposal, supportamong losers in Table
4 and Table 5 increased significantly when they were presented with the more risky version
of the proposal.
Results displayed in Table 4 and Table 5 are, on balance, consistent with our expectation
(Hypothesis 4) that losers are less sensitive to the risk of loss associated with institutional
changes. This effect can be seen in the net difference between winners' and losers'
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TABLE

5

Experimental Results: Expectations about Electoral Loss and Risk
Aversion

Winners

Losers

Net diff. in
effect of
framing
as loss

82.5% (252)
62.4% (242)
- 20.1**

79.6% (88)
68.0% (75)
- 11.6**

8.5%

77.2% (250)
66.6% (243)
- 10.6**

77.6% (85)
68.9% (77)
- 8.7

1.9%

44.9% (245)
42.2% (225)
- 2.7

51.4% (72)
65.1% (86)
+ 13.7**

16.7%*

Respondent's status
Stimulus
Term limits on Congress (framed as gain)
Term limits on Congress (framed as loss)
Percentage point difference
National referendum(framed as gain)
National referendum(framed as loss)
Percentage point difference
PR for Congress (neutralframe)
PR for Congress (framed as loss)
Percentage point difference

Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research.
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October through November 2003.
Note: Cell entries are percentages who agree strongly or very strongly with the proposal for
change, with the total numberof subjects per sub-groupin parentheses.Losers are identified
by responses to the question on their expectations about future elections.
Significance of differences between groups is derived from a logistic regression equation,
where the individual's response to a question about institutional change (1 = strongly
agree/agree,0 = disagree/stronglydisagree) is predictedas a function of the question version
(B, the risky version = 1, version A = 0), being a loser (1 = expects to lose in future,0 = other),
and an interactionterm (question version B X loser), with controls for gender, partisanship,
ideology and age. The interactiontests whether losers' sensitivity to the risky version of a
question about institutionalchange is significantly different from winners'.
*Significant difference between winners and losers in response to the risk frame (reading
across, p < 0.05).
**Significantdifferences within group (readingdown, p < 0.05), based on Z score calculating
significance of difference between proportions.
tSignificant difference between winners and losers in response to risk frame (reading across,
p = 0.14).
responses to proposals that are framed as a risk of loss (this value is listed in the third
column of each table). In Table 4, we find that support for a national referendum declined
significantly more among winners in response to the framing effect than among losers
(a net difference of 14.8 points). In Table 5, we find that winners' support for term limits
also declined significantly more than losers' support did in response to the risk frame
(a net difference of 8.5 points). With the PR proposal, shifts in losers' attitudes were also
significantly less risk aversive than the shift in winners' attitudes.
Thus, in three of the six tests reported in Tables 4 and 5, winners appear to be more risk
aversive to electoral system change than losers. In two other tests, losers might actually
be seen as risk seeking. We find losers more risk aversive than winners in just one of the
six tests. In terms of our schematic hypotheses presented in Table 1, support for reforms
among subjects in Group C was consistently lower than support among subjects in
Group D, and in most cases (A - C)> (B - D). The effect of being a loser assigned
the risk frame was significant in four of six experiments reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Logit models estimating support across all respondents for a national referendum and
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for PR find significantly higher support among congressional losers assigned the version
of reform questions framed as a loss (with loser status and question version held constant).
These results remain significant when age, ideology, gender and partisanshipare accounted
for. Similar models estimating support for term limits and PR find that respondents
expecting to lose in the future who were assigned the question framed as a loss were also
significantly more supportive of those reforms.
Table 6 reports a final experiment designed to evaluate how winners and losers reason
about changing electoral rules. As the Appendix illustrates, our questions about changing
how the US president is elected were framed differently from the other three electoral
reform proposals. Where the other experiments framed risks without making explicit
reference to who is made better or worse off, alternative versions of our Electoral College
question provided respondents with a cue about who might win or lose if the proposal were
adopted.33One version framed this cue as a potential gain: 'states with large populations
could have more influence' if the president were elected by direct popular vote. The
alternative version framed the cue as a potential loss: 'states with small populations could
have less influence'. This framing is closer to the logical equals used in classic tests of risk
aversion34 and it also allows for an experiment where respondents can be classified as
winners or losers based on whether they would benefit or be harmed by a change in the
status quo. Again, half of all respondents were randomly assigned the proposal framed
either as a gain (more influence) or a loss (less influence).
In Table 6, we once again divided our sample to classify respondents as winners
and losers. In this analysis, subjects who lived in states with average or below-average
numbers of Electoral College votes were classified as winners, as they benefited from
status quo arrangements that over-represent their states in the existing presidential
election process. These were people living in states with twelve or fewer electoral
votes.35 We assume that losers under status quo arrangements are those living in the
largest states (having twenty-one or more electoral votes - but far less representation per
person).36
Results in Table 6 are consistent with our initial expectations (see Hypotheses 3 and 4).
Reading across the top row, we see that when the proposal to change to direct election of
the president was framed as a gain ('large states have more influence'), there was a
relatively small difference in support for reform between those who were winners or losers
under the Electoral College status quo. Curiously, slightly more status quo winners (small
33 RecallthattheElectoral
stateswithsmallerpopulations,attheexpenseof stateswith
Collegeover-represents

largerpopulations.
34Kahneman
andTversky,'Prospect
Kahneman
andTversky,'Choices,Values,andFrames'.
Theory';
35 Theaverage
statehadelevenECvotes,withthemedianvaluebeingeight.
36Inpopulous
states(twenty-one
ECvotesormore)onaverage
therewere600,000peoplerepresented
perEC

vote. In smallerand median-sizestates(fewer thantwelve EC votes), on averagetherewere 400,000 people
andthatgeographicdispersionof presidentialcampaign
representedperEC vote. Giventhismallapportionment,

relatedto statepopulation
weassumeit
(seehttp://www.fairvote.org/whopicks/),
activityin stateswasinversely
is validthatpeoplein large(small)statesmightperceivetheylose(win)underthisstatusquo.Thisassumption
formalgametheoretic
thatundercertain
conditions
votersinlargerstatescan
maybesuspect:
logicdemonstrates
have a greaterchanceof playinga 'pivotal'role in presidentialelectionoutcomes.For a review, see Bernard
GrofmanandScottL. Feld, 'Thinkingaboutthe PoliticalImpactsof the ElectoralCollege',Public Choice,123

aboutstatesasactorsincoalition
formation
(2005),1-18.Theseformalmodelsmakeassumptions
gamesthatmay
notbe consistent
withtheperceptions
of actualvoters.Moreover,
thequestion
wasdesigned
to prompt
votersto
considerthatlarge(small)stateswouldhavemore(less)influence
so we areable
undertheproposed
reforms,
to testtheeffectof thatprompt.
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TABLE

6

Experimental Results: Risk Aversion and Reasoning about Proposals
where Winners and Losers are Specified
R winning under R losing under Net difference
status quo rules status quo rules in effect of
(R lives in average (R lives in a
framing as
or small state)
risk of loss
(large state)

Stimulus
Direct election of president means
large states have more influence
(framed as gain)
Direct election of president means
small states have less influence
(framed as loss)
Percentage point difference

57% (166)

52% (112)

46% (152)
- 11**

60% (150)
+ 8t

19%*

Source: Author's survey conducted by Indiana University Center for Survey Research.
National sample, random digit dial, conducted October throughNovember 2003.
Note: Cell entries are percentage who agree strongly or very strongly with the proposal for
change, with the total numberof subjects per subgroupin parentheses.Subjects are classified
by how many Electoral College votes their state controls. Large states are those with 21 or
more, small are those with less than 12.
Significance between groups is determined by a logistic regression equation, where the
individual'sresponseto the ElectoralCollege question(1 = stronglyagree/agree,0 = disagree/
stronglydisagree)is predictedas a functionof questionversion (B, the risk version = 1, version
A = 0), residing in a large state (1 = large state, 0 = other), and an interactionterm (question
version B X large state), with controls for gender, age, ideology and partisanship. The
interaction tests if a large state respondent's sensitivity to the risk version of the Electoral
College question is significantly different from a small state respondent.
*Significantdifference between winners and losers response to the risk frame (readingacross,
p < 0.05).
**Significantdifferences within group (readingdown, p < 0.05), based on Z score calculating
significance of difference between proportions.
tSignificant differences within group (readingdown, p < 0.10), based on Z score calculating
significance of difference between proportions.
state residents) favoured this change that could dilute their influence. Fifty-seven per cent
of small state residents favoured changing to direct election when the proposal was
framed as a gain. This compares to 52 per cent of status quo losers who supported
the proposal when it was presented as a gain. When framed as a gain then, we see
minor differences in levels of support across people who win or lose under existing rules
- and it appears winners were slightly more enthusiastic about changing the rules than
losers.
The pattern reverses, however, when this reform proposal was framed as a loss ('small
states have less influence'). This shift in winners' attitudes provides further evidence that
winners and losers respond differently to risk. When direct election of the president is
framed as a potential loss, only 46 per cent of status quo winners favoured change, a decline
of 11 percentage points compared to winners who were presented with the alternative
frame. Once again, we find that people who are winners under the status quo were much
less supportive of the proposal when it was framed as a loss. Losers, in contrast, became
more supportive when the proposed change in presidential election rules was framed as
a loss. Whereas losers were less supportive of change even than winners when the proposal
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was framed as gain, losers' support for changing to direct elections increased by 8 points
(to 60 per cent) among those exposed to the risk frame.
Thus we see again that winners are more risk averse than losers when reasoning about
proposals to change electoral arrangements, but we also see that losers, beyond simply
being neutral in their response to risk of loss, can be risk acceptant. The net result of this
effect in responding to the risk framing is a substantial 19 point shift in attitudes about how
the president should be elected: an 8 point increase in support for direct elections among
losers associated with their response to risk, plus an 11 point decline in support for direct
presidential elections among winners due to their response to risk.
DISCUSSION

Our survey found ratherhigh levels of supportfor proposals to change electoral institutions
in the United States, and we also found that people who see themselves as losers in the
electoral arena are less satisfied with how well democracy works. At first glance this
suggests that there may be a large constituency in the American mass public who are
receptive to proposals to change electoral institutions. That said, we know that America' s
national electoral institutions, like those of Britain and Canada, are quite stable historically
and have proven to be resistant to structuralchange. Hence the paradox we presented at
the start of this essay: if most voters often support losing candidates, and proposals for
electoral system change are relatively popular, why are electoral institutions so stable? We
can take this a bit farther: if reforms are embraced by losers and winners alike why are
electoral institutions so stable?
There are several possible answers to these questions, and we believe our experimental
findings offer some insight into how the mass public may act - like elites - as a force for
stability in political institutions. First, the framing effects displayed in our experiments
illustrate that relatively high levels of support for institutional change found among those
who win under status quo electoral arrangementscan be quite ethereal. When winners were
prompted to consider that a reform might come at some cost, their support for reform
declined. This was not always the case, however, with losers. In some of these experiments,
losers appeared relatively insensitive to risks associated with changing democratic
institutions. At times, they accepted risk. Winners, in contrast, appearmuch more sensitive
to such risks. In other words, it appears that people are able to sort out how changes in
political institutions might make them better or worse off, and winners and losers reason
differently with this information. When people who are doing well under status quo
institutions realize that there is a risk of loss from institutional change, they are less
supportive of change. When people who are doing less well under status quo institutions
realize that there are risks of loss associated with change, their support for change may
remain firm, or even increase. These effects are rather impressive when we consider that
most of these proposals provided no cues about who the winners and losers would be.
Secondly, the stability of electoral institutions may result from the fact that few
Americans perceive themselves as consistently ending up on the losing side of most
elections. It is possible that these perceptions are rooted in reality, at least in America.
Given the federal nature of America' s election system, and the frequency of elections over
time, few people may end up as chronic electoral losers. Thirdly, and related to this second
point, people may actually vote for losing candidates quite often, yet discount most of the
electoral losses they experience, or they may somehow place greater weight on their wins.
This point is analogous to what psychologists refer to as the partial reinforcement effect,
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where behaviours with satisfying consequences (winning) are strengthened and remembered even if the satisfying consequence does not occur regularly. Put differently, people
might vote regularly (for the same type of candidates) and lose rather often. However, if
their electoral system allows them to win at least occasionally, those wins could outweigh
regular losses in structuring their behaviour and memory - so they may perceive
themselves as winners. And, as we demonstrated above, support for institutional change
can be fairly transient among people who perceive themselves as electoral winners.
Fourthly, rules are clearly designed to insulate electoral institutions from electoral
loser' s preferences. As North notes, institutions themselves, ratherthan moving inexorably
towards efficiency, tend to evolve towards preserving the status of those who make the
rules.37As example, the US Constitution regulates rules about the election of the president,
and reserves the power to adopt term limits for Congress to Congress itself. Even
institutions that can be changed by statute (such as PR for the US House, or some form
of a national referendum process), are regulated by the actors who won office under
existing rules. Clearly, it is difficult to amend the Constitution or pass statutes without
action on the part of electoral winners. Studies show these elites, not surprisingly, are less
supportive of institutional change than their unsuccessful electoral opponents.
Institutional changes are also inherently risky, and the uncertainty attached to changes
makes the whole process of change more complicated than a story grounded in rational
self-interest may allow. Not only that, the risks associated with change may also make
change less likely. Here, however, we have found evidence that losers may not find the
risks associated with change as motivating a reason to oppose change. Although appeal
to the risks of change may dampen winners' support for reforms, appeals to risk may not
dissuade losers from wanting change. If anything, losers may be willing to gamble. This
suggests that if actual institutional reform proposals do reach the public agenda, even
relatively sweeping proposals may be looked on with favour by losers. The difference
between institutional stability and change may then depend upon how many people
perceive themselves as losers.
APPENDIX:

SURVEY

ITEMS

TermLimits
VersionA: Somepeoplesuggestthatthereshouldbe termlimitson membersof Congress- so incumbents
a betterchanceto gain
couldonlyrunforre-electionthreeor fourtimes.Thismightgive newcandidates
office.Wouldyou supportsucha proposal?
VersionB: Somepeoplesuggestthatthereshouldbe termlimitson membersof Congress- so incumbents
couldonlyrunforre-electionthreeor fourtimes.Thismightmeanlosingsomeof the mostexperienced
membersin Congress.Wouldyou supportsucha proposal?
Yes, support

No, oppose

DK/refused

Direct Democracy
VersionA: Thereis a proposalfor a nationalreferendumto permitvoters to approveor reject some federal
laws. An issue would be placed on the ballot if a large numberof voters from aroundthe countrysigned
a petition. Would you supportthis proposalto give voters a direct say in making laws?

37

North,Institutions,InstitutionalChangeand EconomicPerformance.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:48:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

475

ReasoningAboutInstitutionalChange

VersionB: There is a proposalfor a nationalreferendumto permitvoters to approveor reject some federal
laws. An issue would be placed on the ballot if a large numberof voters from aroundthe countrysigned
a petition. Would you supportthis proposal to give voters a direct say in making laws even if it would
underminethe independentjudgment of elected officials?

Yes, support

DK/refused

No, oppose

Electing the President
VersionA: When it comes to electing the President,some suggest we get rid of the ElectoralCollege and
simply elect the candidatewho most people voted for. This would mean that states with large populations
could have more influence over who wins. Would you supportor oppose such a proposal?
VersionB: When it comes to electing the President,some suggest we get rid of the ElectoralCollege and
simply elect the candidatewho most people voted for. This would mean that states with small populations
could have less influence over who wins. Would you supportor oppose such a proposal?

Yes, support

DK/refused

No, oppose

Election of Congress
VersionA: Some people suggest we should use proportionalrepresentationto elect Congress.This would
probablymean that three or more parties would be representedin Congress. Would you supportsuch a
proposal?
VersionB: Some people suggest we should use proportionalrepresentationto elect Congress.This would
probablymean thatthreeor more partieswould be representedin Congress,and could mean thatno single
party would form a majority.Would you supportsuch a proposal?
Yes, support

No, oppose

DK/refused

Measures of Perceptions of Electoral Loss
(A) Think of the presidentialelections held in your lifetime. Do you thinkthatthe presidentialcandidates
you support:

win

Usually

Usually

win

Sometimes

lose

sometimes

or

know

Don't

lose

(B) Think of the elections for US Congress held in your lifetime. Do you thing that the congressional
candidatesyou support:

win

Usually

Usually

lose

win

Sometimes

or

sometimes

lose

know

Don't

(C) Looking ahead to any upcoming local, state, or national elections - how do you think most of the
candidatesyou supportwill do? Do you think:

Most

of

them

might

win

Most

might

lose

Some

might

win,

some

lose

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 16:48:52 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Don't

know

476

BOWLER AND DONOVAN

Satisfactionwith Democracy
(Note:The placementof these measuresof losing was rotatedso thathalf the samplewas askedthem prior
to the satisfactionwith democracyitem (below), and half were asked this priorto the three questions on
losing (above).)
On the whole, how satisfiedareyou with the way democracyworksin the US? Would you say very, fairly,
not very or not at all satisfied?

Very

satisfied

Fairly

satisfied

Not

very

satisfied

Not

at

al

satisfied
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